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Abstract 
Worldwide, individuals are losing their money and identity to online fraud. To combat 
victimisation, prevention approaches generally focus on different types of online fraud 
and how they occur. This article examines online fraud prevention, exemplified through 
the publication entitled The Little Black Book of Scams. It argues this approach is 
characterised by ‘white noise’, in that it presents an overwhelming amount of detail 
about online fraud which obscures what should be a straightforward message. Overall, 
this article argues online prevention approaches need to avoid excessive ‘white noise’ 
and focus on a simplistic key message, around the protection of money and personal 
information.  
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Introduction  
Online fraud destroys the lives of thousands of individuals across the globe on a daily 
basis. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s (ACCC) annual report 
detailed over $93 million losses to online fraud in 2012 (ACCC 2013). The Canadian Anti-
Fraud Centre (CAFC) reported almost $58 million of dollar losses to mass marketing 
fraud in 2013 (CAFC 2014: 6). In the United Kingdom, the National Fraud Authority’s 
(NFA) annual fraud indicator estimated overall identified fraud losses for 2012/13 as 
£15.5 billion, £9.1 billion of which were individuals losses (NFA 2013: 11). These figures 
are unlikely to encapsulate the true extent of monetary losses which occur from this 
type of crime, however even at a minimum, these figures illustrate the substantial 
financial cost of online fraud across several countries.  
 
While the level of harm experienced by victims is significant in terms of monetary losses, 
the impact of the fraud extends far beyond finances to physical, emotional, and 
relational issues (see ASIC 2002a; 2002b; Button et al 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; Cross 2012; 
Ganzini 1990; Titus et al 1995). In addition, there is a small amount of research which 
indicates that the impact of fraud on individual victims can be comparable to those who 
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experience violent crime (Deem 2000; Deem et al 2013; Marsh 2004). In extreme 
circumstances, there are cases reported in the media where victims who were 
defrauded have committed suicide (Brook 2010; Mandel 2013; Porter and Plath 2013).  
 
Given the impact that this type of crime has on individuals, it can be argued that it is an 
important matter for police attention. However, research indicates that fraud is not 
afforded a high priority by police agencies in terms of allocating resources and 
undertaking investigations (Cross and Blackshaw 2014; Doig and Levi 2013; Doig et al 
2001; Frimpong and Baker 2007; Levi 2003). This is even more pronounced in an online 
fraud context, where the characteristics of the act provide many challenges to law 
enforcement in their ability to detect an offence has occurred, investigate the office, 
arrest an alleged offender and prosecute (Button 2012).  
 
Therefore, while enforcement should not be ignored, in most circumstances it is not an 
option for either police agencies or victims. Consequently, prevention becomes an 
important approach to avoid the harm caused by online fraud. It can be argued that 
reducing or stopping victims from sending money or personal details in the first place, is 
of greater value and benefit to both police and victims themselves, rather than trying to 
prosecute offenders and recoup money once it has been lost.  
 
Given the importance of crime prevention, it is vital that the approach and messaging 
used is appropriate and effective for its target audience. This article examines current 
approaches to online fraud prevention, as evident in a publication entitled The Little 
Black Book of Scams (LBBS). In the absence of a global or unified approach to online 
fraud, this publication is argued to be of prominence, given its distribution and adoption 
across Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada. This paper argues that current 
prevention approaches, as evident in the LBBS, are characterised by ‘white noise’. This 
asserts that they present an overwhelming amount of detail about online fraud which 
obscures what should be a simplistic and straightforward message, or alternatively, the 
information is too complex which compromises its effectiveness. To demonstrate this, 
the article draws on empirical data from both victim and offender perspectives, across 
Australia and Canada. This includes excerpts taken from interviews with those who have 
suffered online fraud losses as well as evidence obtained in police investigations into 
offenders who perpetrate online fraud. Overall, this article argues that current 
approaches, exemplified in the LBBS, contain too much ‘white noise’ and that this 
compromises a clear message on how to protect one’s money and personal details.  
 
Methodology 
In order to demonstrate the current analysis, this article draws from two distinct data 
sources. The first comprises 72 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews undertaken by 
one of the authors with 85 seniors (aged 50 years or older) in Queensland, Australia 
during 2009. Each interviewee had received a fraudulent email request for money, 
personal details or passwords, and of the 85 individuals, 29 had responded or suffered 
some sort of loss (as identified in the definition of online fraud cited at the beginning of 
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this article). Therefore, this data set draws on the perspectives of those who responded 
to a fraudulent request as well as those who did not respond. Participants were 
recruited through a combination of public media releases and personal invitations based 
on work that was being undertaken by the relevant police agency in the area of online 
fraud at the time. Interviews were digitally recorded (with the interviewee’s 
permission), partially transcribed and uploaded into NVivo for thematic analysis. The 
interviews with seniors in this data set provide important insights into how victims and 
other seniors more broadly, have experienced prevention messages and the 
applicability of these to their circumstances.  
 
The second data source comprises materials and evidence collected by one of the 
authors during a fraud investigation in Canada. The investigation began with 
information provided to police regarding a female who was allegedly calling people from 
her home, telling them they had won prizes and collecting money from them.  Police 
conducted surveillance and learned that the woman was working in conjunction with at 
least two other males.  Police executed a search warrant on her home and arrested the 
female and her two male accomplices.  Inside the house, police located a quantity of 
documents including phone scripts for a variety of fraudulent schemes, victims’ personal 
information and a variety of electronic devices used to communicate with victims and 
her accomplices.  All three were charged and later plead guilty to fraud-related offences. 
The materials collected as part of this investigation provide clear insights into the minds 
of those perpetrating online fraud, and their methods for achieving this.  
 
Pseudonyms are used through this paper with reference to both data sources, in order 
to protect the identity of the participants, victims and offenders referred to. In 
combination, both data sources provide a unique insight into the problem of online 
fraud, and importantly, shed light on the effectiveness of prevention messages targeted 
at this particular crime type.  
 
Defining online fraud 
Online fraud encompasses a wide variety of offences. For the purposes of this paper, 
online fraud is defined as ‘the experience of an individual who has responded through 
the use of the internet to a dishonest invitation, request, notification or offer by 
providing personal information or money that has led to a financial or non-financial loss 
or impact of some kind’ (Cross et al 2014: 1). Online fraud manifests itself in many 
different forms. One of the most well known forms is ‘advanced fee fraud’, whereby a 
person receives a request to send a small amount of money, with the promise of a 
larger sum of money (Ross and Smith 2011). This may be in the form of a lottery 
notification, being the beneficiary to a deceased estate, and a business or investment 
opportunity to name a few. This type of fraud is also be known as ‘West African fraud’, 
given its origins in Nigeria, or ‘419 fraud’, given the section of the Nigerian legislation 
which relates to this type of crime (Schoenmakers et al 2009).  
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A variation of advanced fee fraud is that of romance fraud. This occurs when a person 
establishes what they perceive to be a legitimate relationship online, however 
throughout the relationship, they are asked to send amounts of money to their ‘partner’ 
for a variety of reasons, which can include illness, criminal justice matters or travel costs 
to visit (Rege 2009). This type of crime is particularly devastating, as the victim not only 
loses money, but also grieves the loss of the relationship (Whitty and Buchanan 2012). 
Another prevalent type of online fraud is ‘phishing’, where a person receives an email 
purporting to be from a bank or other institution, and which asks for personal 
information such as banking details (Choo 2011). This differs to the previous types of 
fraud, in that it seeks personal information from an individual rather than money 
however the details are used to gain financial reward, through identity crime offences.  
 
The above details some of the most popular types of online fraud, however it is vital to 
understand that the number of approaches are endless. In addition, many victimisation 
experiences do not fit into these pre-defined categories, as offenders will use whatever 
means possible to defraud the victim to the greatest extent possible. It is this last point 
which is important to note in terms of the analysis detailed further in this paper.  
 
Publicity as a prevention tool for online fraud 
Publicity, awareness campaigns and educational drives have been used in crime 
prevention for a long time (Sidebottom et al 2009: 271). Across many countries, ‘media 
campaigns are launched periodically to inform the public about the most common 
precautions against crime’ and include accompanying materials such as pamphlets and 
brochures (van Dijk and de Waard 1991: 485). To date, the focus of crime prevention 
campaigns have, 
 
targeted citizens to reduce the likelihood of victimisation (victim focused), 
targeted likely offenders to reduce future offending (offender based), or 
have targeted citizens at large to increase their cooperation and 
participation with law enforcement (information focused) (Flexon and 
Guerette 2009: 608). 
 
A large number of campaigns are victim focused, in that they seek to ‘help the public at 
large protect itself better against crime through increasing its awareness of victimisation 
risks’ (Van Dijk and de Waard 1991: 488) and ‘attempt to reduce an individual’s chance 
of becoming a crime victim through the application of some crime prevention method’ 
(Barthe 2003: 44).  
 
Despite the widespread use of media and publicity to prevent crime, there is limited 
evidence to indicate that it is a successful approach. Flexon and Guerette (2009: 608) 
argue that the literature on the effectiveness of a crime prevention media campaign 
indicates three things: the success of the campaign is contingent upon the type of crime 
which is targeted, it is more likely to change perceptions rather than behaviours, and 
that segments of the population respond differently to the messages. Most evaluations 
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of media and publicity have focused on property crimes, with burglary being the most 
dominant (Barthe 2003: 46). There is evidence to support the use of publicity with 
property crimes, however ‘the research certainly less compelling for non-burglary types 
of offences’ (Mazerolle 2003: 531). Victim focused media campaigns have the least 
support in the literature in terms of effectiveness (Johnson and Bowers 2003: 499), 
while offender based campaigns have been shown to be successful ‘when the threat of 
increased apprehension is communicated through the publicised message’ (Barthe 
2003: 46). In terms of successful media and publicity campaigns targeting crime 
prevention, there is far greater support on their use in promoting road safety messages, 
such as anti-drink driving campaigns than for other types of behaviour (Flexon and 
Guerette 2009; Mazerolle 2003). 
 
 ‘The Little Black Book of Scams’: Demonstrating current prevention approaches  
In 2008, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) released a 
publication entitled The Little Black Book of Scams (LBBS) (ACCC 2008). This publication 
was promoted as a guide to ‘scams, swindles, rorts and rip offs’ (ACCC 2010). The 
booklet contained a detailed array of information on a large number of frauds which 
had been observed within an Australian context. The edition was subsequently revised 
in 2010, but was revamped and released as a second edition in 2012, promoting itself 
instead as ‘a pocket sized guide to spotting, avoiding and reporting consumer fraud’ 
(ACCC 2012). The booklet has been distributed in hard copy, but has also been available 
for electronic download from the ACCC website.  
 
In terms of crime prevention, the LBBS is an example of a victim oriented approach as 
detailed earlier, which targets the general population and aims to provide them with 
information and awareness to reduce the collective likelihood of fraud victimisation 
(Barthe 2003; Van Dijk and de Waard 1991). Smith and Akman (2008: 2) assert that ‘in 
order to reach as many victims as possible, it is necessary to deliver fraud prevention 
information on an extensive scale’ and the LBBS is a prime example of this. The premise 
of the LBBS through the provision of detailed information, is to provide potential fraud 
victims with the knowledge and skills to avoid future victimisation. This can be linked to 
routine activity theory, first advocated by Cohen and Felson in 1979 (and further 
developed by many scholars since), whereby for a criminal act to occur, there needs to 
be the presence of a motivated offender, a suitable victim and the lack of capable 
guardianship. Awareness campaigns targeted at crime prevention, generally base 
themselves on this model, through the intention to ‘exert influence over one or more of 
the three routine activity theory elements’ (Johnson and Bowers 2003: 498). In this case, 
the LBBS is seeking to ‘reduce the vulnerability of potential victims, and hence 
opportunities for crime, by protecting them from motivated offenders’ (Johnson and 
Bowers 2003: 498).  The provision of information about the variety of frauds and scams 
that are in operation is the key element to this publication and its intention to prevent 
fraud victimisation.  
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The publication of the LBBS is significant for a number of reasons. To begin, it is arguably 
the first comprehensive resource published in an Australian context, which examines 
the issue of consumer fraud across all mediums (online, phone, mail and door to door 
contexts), though there is a strong focus on internet fraud. Second, it provides a 
detailed description of various types of fraud. The first edition canvassed fifteen 
different types of frauds, while the second edition details ‘the scammers black list – the 
top ten scams to avoid’ (ACCC 2012: 3). In addition to providing details about specific 
categories of fraud, it provides insight into how an offender may defraud a person in a 
section called ‘the scammers toolbox’ (ACCC 2012: 27) and advice on how to avoid 
victimisation, through ‘the golden rules – the top ten tips to protect yourself’ (ACCC 
2012: 29). Third, it has had enormous influence on the global message of prevention. 
The introduction to the second edition of the Australian version asserts that ‘The Little 
Black Book of Scams is recognised internationally as an important tool for consumers 
and small businesses to learn about scams’ (ACCC 2012: 2). This is evident through the 
publication of two editions of The Little Book of Big Scams, released by the Metropolitan 
Police (the second edition in 2013), and The Little Black Book of Scams: Your Guide to 
Protection Against Fraud published by the Competition Bureau Canada in 2012.  
 
Given its popularity and prevalence, the LBBS can be seen as an important tool in 
prevention efforts. It is for that reason that this article uses this publication as a basis for 
analysing current prevention messages.  The key element to any fraudulent offence is 
the transfer of money or personal details. Without the transfer of money, or the sending 
of personal details, there is no fraud offence and no victim. The success or failure of all 
prevention messages and awareness campaigns culminates in the decision of a person 
to comply or not comply with such a request, across all circumstances. Consequently, 
this paper will put forward two main arguments, that the current message are overly 
complex and information heavy and second, that the need to classify fraud into discrete 
categories is redundant from an offender’s perspective. 
 
Overall, this paper asserts that the key prevention message regarding online fraud 
should be focused specifically on the transfer of money and personal details. While it 
will be demonstrated that this message is evident in the current approach, it is argued 
that the essence of this message, being the protection of money and personal details in 
any circumstance, is currently diluted with excessive ‘white noise’, whereby there is an 
overwhelming level of detail present which obscure its main point. Through an analysis 
of the LBBS contrasted with the evidence contained in the empirical data, this paper 
argues that there is a need to revise the content and delivery of current prevention 
messages. It is important to note that this paper will not present an evaluation of the 
LBBS as such, rather it seeks to highlight the central focus of the publication and the way 
it presents information about fraud to demonstrate how these could be improved. 
 
Too much detail 
Given the LBBS is a victim oriented approach to crime prevention, it relies upon the 
presentation of a large amount of detail about this crime category, in terms of the many 
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different types of fraud that exist and the number of ways that fraud can be perpetrated 
against an individual. Examples of this are found within all jurisdictional versions of the 
LBBS. In combination, the three publications detail over twenty different categories of 
fraud, with some crossover (dating and romance scams are detailed in all three 
publications, as are health and medical scams). However, there is not necessarily any 
consistency in the publications regarding what constitutes each category of fraud, such 
as Australia using the category ‘[online shopping, classified and auction scams’, which is 
termed ‘internet scams’ in Canada and the United Kingdom. The same category of 
‘internet scams’ also encompasses phishing in Canada and the United Kingdom, but is a 
separate category of ‘banking, credit card and online account scams’ in Australia. This 
demonstrates the inconsistency that exists with definitions of fraud and the 
characteristics of what each type of fraud category encompasses.  
 
Regardless of the arbitrary nature of fraud categories and their overlap, each 
publication is based on providing the reader (or potential victim) with detailed 
information about these fraud categories, which includes common characteristics of 
each type of fraud (how it generally presents to potential victims and how it is 
perpetrated for example). All publications offer things to look out for, rules, handy hints 
and guidance on how to avoid becoming the victim of a fraud, as well as outlining how 
to report victimisation if it should occur.  To illustrate this, the Australian version details 
how to ‘protect yourself’, the British version has a box with the prompts ‘remember, 
caution, think and investigate’, and the Canadian version has this same box entitled 
‘protect yourself’ and has the same prompts as the UK version with the additional 
prompt of ‘ask yourself’.  
 
It is evident that these publications provide a high level of detail on each potential fraud 
type. However, it can be argued that this is not an effective prevention or awareness 
mechanism because it overwhelms the individual and provides an excessive amount of 
information to process. It also directs potential victims to look for characteristics or 
‘plotlines’ in a fraud that may not exist in an approach directed specifically at them. This 
was the case for a number of actual fraud victims in Australia, who reported knowledge 
of other types of fraud, but were not aware of the specific fraud, or fraudulent approach 
that they fell victim to.  
 
For example, Judith was the victim of romance fraud, but prior to her own experience, 
had never heard of that type of fraud.  
 
Interviewer: So you said prior to this, that you didn’t really know, you hadn’t really heard in 
the media about these types of things? 
Judith: No I hadn’t. Not like they are advertising it at the moment. As I said, the only thing I 
knew about was the letters because that was something that was in the media and that 
people were getting them and as I said, I got some and I just tore them up… that the only 
thing I knew about, was just the letter one, I didn’t know about anything else.  
Interviewer: Do you think that if you had heard about them in the media that you would 
have thought twice? 
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Judith: Yes I would have. I would have really, really thought about it then. But no, as I said, I 
only knew about the letters, I didn’t know about the online stuff at all.  
 
Judith was not the only victim of romance fraud who was unaware of her specific type 
of fraud. The same can be said for Ruth who was also a victim of romance fraud.  
 
Ruth: …I had no idea about that [romance fraud]. Not romance sort of scams. I guess I had 
heard scams wanting to send money but there was no emotional involvement in those sorts 
of things so they are easy to detect. But this wasn’t easy initially, and then all of a sudden… 
Interviewer: You are in the middle of it? 
Ruth: You are in the middle of it and there are often times in the beginning I think, oh I wish 
this was a scam, it would be easy just to get out of but there was no indication that there 
was initially. 
 
As stated, Ruth had heard about frauds where a person was required to send money, 
but she did not associate that to her own experience, despite the fact she was sending 
money overseas in exactly the same manner as the other types of fraud. For Ruth, the 
approach (in this instance through her perception of a legitimate relationship) did not 
allow her to see that she was being defrauded in the same way as other schemes she 
was aware of.  
 
This is also evident in the example of Hazel, who was a victim of an investment fraud. 
Hazel lost over three hundred thousand dollars to an investment fraud, where she 
believed she had a legitimate contract to undertake a specific job.  
 
Interviewer: So had you heard about these types of frauds before you got involved in this 
one? Had you heard about people responding to emails? 
Hazel: Yes. I had. But it was all more oil or investments or it was, yeah. It was more investing 
or more, I didn’t think I was investing, I thought I was going to do a job. But I am sure that 
they have got lots of people thinking they are going to do a job.  
 
While each version of the LBBS highlight the vulnerability of all individuals to fraud, and 
argue that it does not discriminate, these three examples illustrate the fact that 
educating about specific types of fraud is not always effective. Rather, education 
messages need to focus on the key element of all frauds, which in all scenarios, is the 
transfer of money. In each of these examples, the victim was aware of other types of 
fraud where a victim sends money overseas, but was not able to associate or apply this 
to the approach used against them. Judith expected the approach to be through a letter 
in the mail rather than an email, Ruth expected the approach to be though an 
impersonal communication rather than through a targeted personal relationship, and 
Hazel expected the approach to be about a different kind of investment, rather than the 
job she anticipated she was going to do. Despite the victim’s knowledge about other 
fraud types, the offender was successful in subverting this knowledge and gaining 
substantial amounts of money from each of the three victims detailed.  
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A critical point to emerge from this analysis stems from the fact that the fraudulent 
approach is not a static characteristic. From an offender’s perspective, the way that a 
victim is approached is not important so long as the attempt is successful and results in 
the acquisition of money or personal information. An awareness of mail fraud did not 
stop Judith from being target through the internet. An awareness of advance fee fraud 
did not help Ruth in her identification of the romance fraud she was involved in and 
finally, an awareness of oil investments did not prevent Hazel from recognising that her 
business opportunity was also fraudulent. However, in each circumstance, the offender 
was successful in obtaining money from these victims, and the way in which it was 
perpetrated is of little relevance to them. It is this point to which the paper now turns.  
 
The differentiation of fraud types is redundant to offenders 
As highlighted in the previous section, one critique against fraud classifications is that it 
assumes the plotlines are differentiated enough from one approach to another, and that 
they require a separate category or classification.  However, the only real differences 
from one approach to another are the micro-details of the initial pitch and the 
subsequent dollar amounts associated with each request. Though there is arguably 
some value in tracking the prevalence of certain fraud approaches and victimization, this 
paper argues that there is limited value in such categorisation when it comes to 
prevention initiatives, as indicated by the examples presented above. Rather the 
categorisation of fraud types can work against prevention, with victims believing that 
because their situation or ‘plotline’ is different to what they know or have heard, it is 
not fraudulent.  
 
For an offender, the type of approach selected is irrelevant, so long as it successfully 
targets a weakness or susceptibility identified in a potential victim. On this basis, an 
offender will select a plotline or an approach specifically tailored to appeal to the 
intended victim.  An example of this level of specialisation is reflected in evidence 
obtained below during a fraud investigation in Canada, which presents a conversation 
between an individual operating a lottery fraud and their friend, on a messenger 
service.  
 
Person 1: I send letters and phone calls. I don’t bomb 
Person 2: So when u send letters and make calls hw does that exactly work out? 
Person 1: Well it’s a step by step thing. We get rich ones out and work on them 
Person 2: Ok 
Person 1: Like face 2 face sort of thing 
Person 1: But trust me I make close to 1 or 2m dolls every year 
Person 2: That’s a nice pay check still. But is it only u involved? 
Person 1: Well yea I can do it myself 
Person 2: U into transfers? 
Person 1: Not really but I can set up logins frm the infos I get frm my client 
Person 1: Still on my lotto 
Person 1: I send letters n dey call me bck with any phone number I want them to call 
Person 2: So what’s the next level after that 
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Person 1: Then I will ask them for any details of there life that way I will knw what they 
worth 
Person 2: Both Us and Canada phone numbers 
Person 1: Yes 
Person 2: With names? 
Person 1: Yea 
Person 2: and there Occupatons? 
Person 1: I want old ppl 70yrs upward 
Person 2: like 50’s plus 
Person 2: I fit dey get them frm dating sites too 
 
This excerpt demonstrates a number of key points. The offender (person 1) states how 
he is currently operating lottery a lottery fraud, through the use of letters and phone 
calls. He makes contact with his victims and requests that they contact him on a US or 
Canadian phone number that he provides. Through this contact, he is able to gain 
information about the victim which allows him to know their financial worth and their 
weaknesses or vulnerabilities, which arguably provides a foundation to target the 
person in a different type of fraud (as will be illustrated below). This would also 
encompass using information such as occupation, which was mentioned in the 
conversation.  
 
The second point relates to the interchangeability of the plotlines to each fraud. The 
offender states how he is operating a lottery scheme, however his friend suggests that 
he can also obtain potential victims from online dating websites. In addition, this is 
illustrated in the question about money transfers. While the offender stipulates he is 
not really into money transfers, he does state that he can set up logins from the 
information he obtains from his victims to facilitate this. In combination, both of these 
points highlight how the details of the fraud (or the plotline) are irrelevant to the 
offender. So long as the offender is able to obtain money from the victim (and personal 
information to assist with this) then the approach taken by the offender is of little 
consequence.  
 
The specificity of the offender’s target list underscores the importance of matching a 
pitch to a particular set of needs or vulnerabilities.  Offenders running fraudulent 
schemes experience similar time and logistical constraints as others engaged in 
legitimate endeavours.  With this in mind, an offender must match the targets and 
plotlines to ensure a higher probability of success. Plot variance is not always a decision 
made at the outset of a fraudulent scheme.  Some victims, having already sent money 
under the guise of one plotline, will seamlessly be presented with a completely new 
pitch, which could be either an extension of the original plotline or a new addition. 
 
In a Canadian example, Cathy was contacted by an individual calling himself a lawyer 
stating that the victim was the beneficiary of an overseas estate.  The deceased person, 
who was said to have been killed in the 2004 tsunami, had left a safety deposit box filled 
with family heirlooms and cash.  In the span of a few months Cathy sent more than 
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$200,000 in wire transfers to foreign countries to pay for various taxes and expenses 
purportedly associated with importing the box. 
 
At some point Cathy realised that she was the victim of fraud.  A short time later she 
was contacted by the offender(s) and was asked to arrange for a hotel room the 
following week where she would receive the box and pay the final fees. An individual 
was arrested as he entered the hotel room and he was found to be in possession of a 
box.  Inside the box and the offender’s vehicle, police located paperwork and materials 
suggesting that the victim was to be presented with a box filled with what appeared to 
be bundles of cash that were contaminated and needed expensive chemical treatments 
in order to be rendered safe and useable.   
 
Having successfully executed the first type of fraudulent approach (under the guise of 
an inheritance), the offender(s) were positioning to extract even more money from the 
victim in what is known as a ‘black money scheme’ (Buchanan and Grant 2001).  The 
contaminated money is a natural segue as it offers an opportunity for a victim to see the 
money they were promised.  This is done within a context that the victim has already 
invested too much financially to walk away with the introduction of a new plotline. 
 
Such twists are not uncommon, with similar incidents occurring with an Australian 
context. For example, Frank was originally defrauded in the context of a relationship. 
Frank had recently lost his wife to a particular illness, and it was through this same 
illness that he initially sent money to the offender/s. 
 
…and then her brother calls me, sends me an email under her [offenders] name and said 
she got hit by a car, her brains bleeding anyway, I just lost my wife with a brain hemorrhage, 
and they wanted $1000 for the doctor, to operate, they won’t do anything unless you pay 
so I sent them $1000 $1200. Then it started, as you say it’s all bull** it wasn’t nothing about 
it that’s what they do, and then I went over there, and then she [offender] had gold you see 
and this sounds good, but not knowing anything about mining or gold you know, 1500kg of 
gold, that her [offender’s] father had left her… 
 
This example illustrates how the first plotline (through a perceived legitimate 
relationship) soon transitioned into an investment plotline, where Frank was invited to 
assist in the mining and sale of gold. To the offenders, the details of the plotline are 
irrelevant, so long as Frank remains involved and continues to send and invest money. 
This can also be seen in the emergence of recovery schemes, where victims who have 
been defrauded and ceased contact with their offenders, are approached by individuals 
claiming to be law enforcement who claim they can recover their lost funds for a fee. In 
the case of Julia, offenders attempted to defraud her in this manner, however were 
unsuccessful.  
 
But I even had the EFCC ring me. We have taken over your case, we have discovered that 
you have been scammed, blah, blah, blah. We will get you in contact with an agent and you 
can talk to him about what to do. I did all that and the agent says ok, they are going to 
reimburse your thirty four thousand dollars. I said, oh, that’s really good. But you need to 
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send ten thousand dollars. I said, yeah likely story… They really play with your mind (Julia, 
respondent). 
 
This is a prime example of how recover frauds can operate. The Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) is an enforcement agency in Nigeria established to combat 
fraud perpetrated from Nigeria. The legitimate existence of this agency provides the 
guise through which offenders will try to obtain further money from victims, who may 
send the money thinking that they are assisting with law enforcement and they will be 
able to recover some of their funds. However, the reality is that they simply are 
revictimised and lose further amounts of money.  
 
A shift in the type of approach can also be used by an offender, in an attempt to obtain 
the highest amount of money possible from a victim. This was evident in the case of 
Judith, who as previously noted was a victim of romance fraud. Judith ceased 
communication with her original offender because she had run out of money and had 
nothing left to send. Based on her actions, the offenders twisted the plotline in an 
attempt to continue receiving money from her.  
 
I was talking to the son online and he said his father had died, that he had gone to hospital 
and died cause he couldn’t get the money, he had worried himself to death or some dash 
thing. I thought it is alright for you and then the son got very abusive and wanted money as 
well and I turned around and said, no I don’t have any money. They said we [son and 
daughter] want tickets to fly home and I just turned around and said, well I will buy the 
tickets and send it to them.  No, no, no, we need the money. I said no, you either accept the 
tickets, no I didn’t have the money to do it, but I just said, you either accept the tickets, I 
either send you the tickets or you work it out for yourself. I just sort of left it at that… But 
see this was somebody different or I think it was somebody different but you don’t know.  
 
The above indicates how the plotline to a fraudulent scheme can change and evolve in 
order to entice the victim to continue sending money. When Judith refused to send any 
money to the offender she believed she was in a relationship with, another offender 
(being the son in this instance) started to communicate with her after the alleged death 
of his father, and in an attempt to extract additional money from her. The ability to so 
readily and seamlessly change plotlines underscores how ultimately meaningless they 
are as a basis for differentiation or education. As these examples highlight, offenders 
consistently move between plotlines, in an attempt to continue extracting funds from a 
victim.  
 
Further evidence of this comes from a Canadian home where police executed a search 
warrant.  Inside the home, officers found scripts and templates for multiple advanced 
fee loan schemes, a lottery scheme and a secret shopper scheme, with multiple names 
and phone numbers scribbled across the various scripts. The offender used multiple 
cellular phones and simultaneously conducted and coordinated fraudulent acts with 
other co-conspirators. The offender set up advertisements in newspapers, took initial 
phone calls from victims and relayed payment instructions. Another co-conspirator 
played the role of a manager, speaking with victims and recruiting others to receive 
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money from victims.  Materials seized from the home and garbage showed that the 
group of offenders were operating each of these fraudulent schemes concurrent to one 
another.  Again, this demonstrates how an offender will utilise a variety of plotlines and 
approaches in order to exploit a wide range of potential victims’ needs or vulnerabilities. 
They are not tied to one specific approach, rather the type of plotline employed by the 
offender has no specific meaning or relevance beyond whether it was successful or not.   
  
Conclusion 
The LBBS is an example of a victim oriented crime prevention approach, which focuses 
on the provision of a high level of detailed information on a wide variety of fraudulent 
categories and approaches. Given the prevalence of fraud victimisation, the importance 
of prevention and awareness is essential to future prevention efforts. The focus on 
arming potential victims with knowledge and skills to avoid this type of victimisation 
should not be ignored.  
 
However, this paper has argued that the current approach to prevention, as exemplified 
through the LBBS and its derivatives, focus on an excessive amount of detail and 
information for readers. Instead, this paper argues that the focal point of prevention 
must remain the relevant variable, which centres on an individual’s response when 
asked to send money or personal details by an offender. As demonstrated above, 
victims who had seen educational materials and had been aware of other fraudulent 
schemes were not been able to translate this education or awareness into their own 
situations. In addition, perpetrators do not maintain the prescribed boundaries between 
different plotlines in fraud, rather they will use whatever means necessary to optimise 
the amount of money they can obtain from victims. Therefore, education and 
prevention campaigns based solely on informing potential victims on the potential 
plotlines used by offenders are not always effective.  
 
Overall, this paper has argued that current fraud prevention approaches are overly 
complex and irrelevant from an offender’s perspective. It is asserted that they are 
characterised by ‘white noise’ in that they fail to adequately articulate the critical point 
of any victimisation experience, being the sending of money or personal details. All 
prevention messages culminate in success or failure at the point where a person is 
confronted with the decision to send or not send. Based on the evidence and arguments 
presented in this paper, future prevention approaches need to be focused on the 
simplistic message of protecting money and protecting personal information. While 
detailed knowledge and information of different fraud types and how they are 
perpetrated is important, it should not be the basis for a prevention approach. As 
evidenced by the current content of the LBBS across Australia, United Kingdom and 
Canada, the essential prevention message should be far more simplistic and universal 
around the protection of money and personal information, rather than divesting it into 
an extensive and highly detailed, fraud classification system.  
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